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Abstract. This paper examines the impact of brokers, brokerage firms and marketing 
strategy on time on the market (TOM) in the residential housing market. Using a duration 
model methodology, the study finds duration dependence to be positive, suggesting that the 
probability of sale increases with TOM. Pricing-related marketing strategies are found to 
strongly influence TOM, but individual agent and firm characteristics are not statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with an efficient market within a multiple listing 
service—no group of agents or firms appears to possess special advantages enabling them 
to sell homes more quickly than their rivals. 
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Introduction 
Residential housing is not a liquid asset, as anyone who has ever tried to sell a house can 
attest. Because housing is illiquid, homesellers often employ real estate brokers to assist 
with a sale. This paper assesses the impacts of brokers, brokerage firms and price-related 
marketing strategies on housing liquidity. 
The degree of housing market illiquidity is most often measured by time on the market 
(TOM). A number of studies have examined the determinants of TOM. Belkin, Hempel 
and McLeavey (1976) demonstrate that TOM is a positive function of the difference 
between listing price and selling price. Miller (1978) reports a positive relationship 
between list price and TOM. Additional studies by Janssen and Jobson (1980), Kang and 
Gardner (1989), and Asabere, Huffman and Mehdian (1993) have confirmed that listing 
price and above-market pricing affect TOM. These studies, however, use regression 
analysis instead of the more appropriate duration model approach. 
Kalra and Chan (1994), Yang and Yavas (1995a), and Haurin (1988) report that 
TOM is influenced by local and national economic conditions and is subject to strong 
seasonal effects. Haurin (1988), drawing on search theory developed by Feinberg and 
Johnson (1977), shows that TOM is positively related to the atypicality of a house, that 
is, more unusual houses require more time to market. 
Haurin also reports that larger brokerage firms sell homes more rapidly than smaller 
ones. The effect of brokerage firm size on TOM is confirmed by Larsen and Park (1989) 
and Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991); however, Yang and Yavas (1995a) report 
that the size of the selling firm has no effect. In a separate study, Yang and Yavas (1995b) 
find that homes listed and sold by the same brokerage firm do not sell more rapidly than 
others. Their findings do not support the suspicions of some researchers (see Carney, 
1982, and Frew, 1987) that listing brokers may systematically delay submitting properties 
 
 
 
to their multiple listing service (MLS) that they expect to sell quickly and at low cost. 
Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) also find no support for this proposition. Yang 
and Yavas (1995b) report further that commission rates of selling agents do not 
significantly impact TOM; however, increases in the number of listings (sales) of the 
listing agent increases (decreases) TOM. 
Most brokers try to represent themselves as having special abilities and knowledge that 
enable them to sell a home more quickly and at a higher price than their rivals. When 
choosing a real estate agent to sell a home, sellers often are encouraged by broker 
advertising to select the agent who touts selling a home at a higher price in a shorter 
period of time. The question in which we are interested is whether the seller's choice of a 
real estate agent affects housing liquidity, or TOM. From the seller's perspective, the 
issue is whether there are savings in marketing time to listing with some agents or firms 
in preference to others. Section two of the paper formulates an analytical model to 
assess agent performance. Sections three and four present the methodology and sample 
data, respectively. Section five sets forth empirical estimates of the model, and the final 
section summarizes findings and discusses the implications of the study. 
 
 
 
A number of factors included in the vector Z have been identified in previous research. 
These include the degree of above-market pricing, atypicality, market conditions, and 
seasonality. Our study introduces characteristics of the listing and selling brokerage firms 
and the listing and selling agents. 
The null hypothesis of the study is that there are no significant differences among 
firms or agents in the time required to sell brokered homes.2 The basic question of the 
study, therefore, may be formulated as: Are there marketing time savings attributable to 
the productivity of brokerage firms or agents? 
Methodology 
In this study, the dependent variable is a home's time until sale or time on the market 
(TOM). Many empirical TOM studies have relied on log-linear regression models 
(Belkin et al., 1976; Miller, 1978; Sirmans et al., 1991). Although it is sometimes 
possible to use a regression log-linear regression approach, Kiefer (1988) details 
the numerous transformations of the OLS model required to correct for OLS 
deficiencies. For example, test statistics will be incorrect because of non-normality of the 
error term. In addition, because the mean of the error term is non-zero, the intercept 
estimate must be adjusted. Censoring of data can be accommodated using Tobit-like 
methods; however, the estimation problem becomes nonlinear in nature. 
Duration models have been used more recently in TOM research (Zuehlke, 1987; Yang 
and Yavas, 1995b). The survival function originates from the distribution function F(t), 
and is defined by the probability that the random variable TOM will exceed some value 
defined as t:3 
 
The hazard function, which is related to the survival function, is the rate at which home 
sales are completed after duration t given that they last at least until time t. Given the 
probability density functionf(t) corresponding to F (t), the hazard function is specified as 
follows: 
 
The choice of duration model depends on the choice of hazard function. In analyses 
where the hazard rate does not vary over time, i.e., the probability of a sale is the same 
regardless of when the observation is made, the exponential distribution provides simple 
and accurate parameter estimates. However, prior studies of TOM indicate the hazard 
rate is not constant (Zuehlke, 1987; Yang and Yavas, 1995b). Yang and Yavas (1995b) 
detect negative duration dependence using a Weibull duration model, which 
corresponds to less chance of a home sale as time progresses.4 The Weibull hazard 
function is flexible, as it assumes a monotonically increasing or decreasing function.5 
The Weibull hazard function is: 
 
 
 
where y=exp (Xβ), α is the duration dependence parameter, and X is the vector of 
regression variables. The exponential hazard function is a special case of the Weibull 
model occurring when α=1. 
Heterogeneity occurs if individual observations in a population have different 
distributions. Although explanatory variables are included in the duration model to 
control for heterogeneity, they may not provide a complete specification or not be 
observable variables. In this case, individual observations have differing duration 
distributions, which renders misleading inferences about duration dependence and 
included explanatory variables (Kiefer, 1988). In general, heterogeneity leads to a 
downward bias in duration dependence. Greene (1993) notes that the gamma Weibull 
model offers corrections for problems associated with heterogeneity of the survival 
distribution. Using the Weibull duration model with correction for heterogeneity, 
Zuehlke finds vacant houses exhibit positive duration dependence, suggesting it is more 
likely that the duration will end as time progresses. 
Using the Weibull hazard function, with LTOM1 as the natural logarithm of time on 
the market for home i, the operational model is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
It is interesting to note that neither characteristics of the listing or selling agent had a 
statistically significant influence on TOM. That is, the number of sales of the listing and 
selling agents did not have a statistically significant influence on TOM. Similarly, the 
number of sales listing and selling agent offices had an imperceptible statistical effect on 
TOM, as did whether or not the firm belonged to a franchise. Likewise, TOM does not 
appear to be reduced if a home is listed and sold by the same brokerage office. 
To further examine the impact of the brokerage-related variables, we conducted a joint 
test of the significance of all the brokerage and agent variables 
in the model. Applying a likelihood ratio test to the Weibull model with 0 
heterogeneity (column 4 in Exhibit 4) we calculate a chi-square value (with 5 degrees 
of 
 
 
 
freedom) of 6.99, which has a probability value of 0.221. Accordingly, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the brokerage and agent parameter characteristics vector is zero. 
Although the findings of nonsignificance of many broker and brokerage firm 
characteristics are consistent with those of Yang and Yavas (1995a), they did find that 
listing the property with a successful listing agent corresponds to decreases in TOM. Our 
study finds that listing property with a successful agent does not reduce a home's TOM. 
In general, the nonsignificance of broker and brokerage firm characteristics is 
consistent with the notion of an efficient market for home selling. Although successful 
agents do facilitate the housing market as a whole, the dissemination of information 
through the multiple listing service creates an efficient market to bring buyers and sellers 
together for particular home purchases or sales.11 
As expected, home atypicality is positively related to TOM; homes that are more 
atypical take longer to sell. This variable has been tested in prior research by Haurin 
(1988). 
Conclusions and Implications 
This paper explores the effect of brokerage firm and agent characteristics on the time it 
takes to market a home. The study finds no evidence that particular agents or firms are 
able to market a home faster than others. This finding is consistent with the idea of 
efficient information flow in the MLS market, where agents and firms do not possess 
special advantages since information within the MLS is shared. Information 
advantages 
 
 
 
do not appear to be internally generated either, as we find no evidence that TOM is 
affected when the listing and selling agents are in the same real estate firm. These results 
accord with past work reported by Jud and Winkler (1994) showing that there are no 
differences among brokers in the prices paid for homes in an MLS. 
The results indicate that the list price, changes in the list price, and home atypicality are 
very important determinants of TOM. Higher list prices are associated with higher 
TOM, and reducing the listed price decreases TOM. Home atypicality is directly 
related to TOM, with more atypical homes having longer average TOM. 
Notes 
1 Miller (1978) shows that selling price and TOM are positively related. 
2 In terms of the structural equations, a finding that D=0 is consistent with either B= C=O 
or C= —c 1 B. In the first instance, agents and firms have no special influence on price (B=0) and 
TOM (C=0). In the second case, the lower TOM resulting from a shift in equation (4) is offset 
by the higher price caused by a shift in equation (3). In this second case, the implication is that while 
some agents or firms produce a higher price, there is no influence on TOM. Because our model is 
not able to identify the structural equations, we cannot distinguish the two alternatives. Thus, 
our results test only TOM effects. Nevertheless, TOM effects are important. And a recent study of 
price effects by Jud and Winkler (1994) finds no consistent price effects related to agents and 
firms, which suggests that the second case is not a relevant alternative. 
3 Bandopadhyaya (1994) provides a very clear explanation of duration models within the context 
of the time that firms spend in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
4 As new buyers continually enter the pool of homebuyers where homes prices and 
characteristics are disseminated through the MLS database, it seems reasonable to expect duration 
to be constant or perhaps slightly positive as agents should be more aware of older listings and 
therefore, steer potential homebuyers to older listings. On the other hand, if old listings have a 
"stigma" attached to them, this might explain the finding of negative duration dependence. 
5 In addition to the Weibull hazard function, hazards for log-normal and log-logistic 
distributions first increase and then decrease. Researchers often compute the log likelihood function 
and plot the survival, hazard, and integrated hazard functions to determine the most 
appropriate duration model. 
6 The hedonic price equation used in this study is the same as that reported in the appendix to 
Jud and Winkler (1994). 
7 For analysis of the determinants of REALTOR productivity and earnings, see Crellin, Frew 
and Jud (1988) and Glower and Hendershott (1988). 
8 Given the number of agents in the study, the use of dummy variables for individual agents is not 
feasible. The number of dummy variables is too large, and collinearity with the structural variables 
for the firm exists. 
9 One might suspect the possibility of a selectivity bias in the analysis because buyers and sellers 
are not randomly assigned to real estate firms, but actively pick their brokers. If brokers are chosen 
by buyers and sellers, then TOM differentials could potentially result from the differences 
among buyers and sellers, not from differences in broker productivity. Were this to be the case, one 
would expect to find that house prices vary among different groups of homebuyers. This 
question has been examined recently by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993). Using MLS data from 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, they report no significant differences in housing prices across various 
groups of buyers. The results of Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) suggest that whatever TOM 
differentials prevail in the market, they are not associated with identifiable characteristics of 
homebuyers and sellers. 
10 For discussion and evidence of the perceptions of consumers and agents involved in this kind of 
transaction, see Ball and Nourse (1988). An excellent discussion of the legal issues in this type of 
 
 
 
 
relationship can be found in Marsh and Zumpano (1988). In our sample of MLS sales in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, the listing and selling firms were the same in 33% of the 
transactions.  
11 An analogous argument occurs in the stock brokerage industry. Individual successful stock 
brokers help make the entire market efficient, but they do not get sellers a higher price or sell a 
stock sooner. 
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